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RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS:
PERFIDY, PREEMPTION, AND IRRATIONALITY
Louis Reng Beres*
The French dramatist and diplomat, Jean Giraudoux, inquires in So-
dome et Gomorrhe,"C'est beau, n 'est-ce pas, lafin du monde?"' "It is beau-
tiful, isn't it, the end of the world?"
Like the ironic playwright who explodes the myth of an ordered
cosmos, the contemporary terrorist often sees great beauty in the ultimate
form of disorder, in chaotic visions of an apocalyptic end to "heresy,"
"blasphemy," "apostasy," and all other forms of unbelief. For the terrorist
who remains defined in many different ways by the diverse worlds of law
and politics, violence is not only a sacred path to universal cleansing and
redemption, it is the only path. What is more, this "path"-to continue the
metaphor-is more than a means to an end. It is in essence the end, an end
unto itself.
2
* Professor of Political Science, Purdue University. Louis Rend Beres was educated at
Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of nine books and several hundred articles dealing
with military strategy, counter-terrorism, international relations and international law. He
was born in Zurich, Switzerland on August 31, 1945, and often writes for major American,
European, and Israeli newspapers. Professor Bdres is Chair of Project Daniel, a private nuc-
lear advisory group (regarding Iran) to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Recently
he has co-authored several different articles on the limits of Israel's ballistic missile defense
with Lt. General Tom Mclnerney (USAF/Ret.); Major-General Paul Vallely (USA/Ret.); and
Major-General Isaac Ben-Israel (IDF/Res.). This article was originally presented on March
30, 2007 as a lecture at the Roe Green Foundation conference "Sacred Violence: Religion
and Terrorism" organized by the Institute for Global Security Law and Policy at the Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. A webcast of the conference may be accessed at
http://law.case.edu/centers/igslp/webcast.asp?dt=20070330.
1 JEAN GIRAUDoux, SODOME ET GOMORRHE 96(1943).
2 Today this path can even include nuclear terrorism. For earlier writing by this author on
such mass-casualty terrorism in particular, see generally LOUIS RENE BERES, APOCALYPSE:
NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980); Louis RENIt BERES, TERRORISM AND
GLOBAL SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR THREAT (2d ed. 1987); Louis Rend Beres, Is Nuclear Ter-
rorism Plausible?, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DEFINING THE THREAT 45-53 (Paul Leventhal &
Yonah Alexander, eds., 1986); Louis Rend Beres, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Responses
to Terrorist Grievances, in PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM 146-59 (Paul Leventhal &
Yonah Alexander eds., 1987); Louis Rend Beres, Responding to the Threat of Nuclear Ter-
rorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONTROLS 228 (Charles
W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990); Louis Rend Beres, Confronting Nuclear Terrorism, 14 HASTINGS
INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 129 (1990); Louis Rend Beres, Hic Sunt Dracones: The Nuclear
Threat of International Terrorism, PARAMETERS: J. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE 11-19 (1979);
Louis Rend Beres, International Terrorism and World Order: The Nuclear Threat, 12 STAN.
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For the individual terrorist-and today we really mean the Jihadist
terrorist-violent destruction of blasphemers, infidels, and apostates is in-
contestably a distinct form of religious sacrifice.3 And as is the case with all
such forms of worship, sacrifice is meant to alleviate the death fears of the
perpetrator (the "high priest") by bringing death to "others." It is generally
believed that the suicide-bomber is fearless, cruel, and not only willing, but
even eager to die for the greater glory of Allah. In fact, nothing could be
farther from the truth. The suicide-bomber kills himself in order to avoid
death. One must understand that the "death" the suicide-bomber expects to
suffer is little more than a momentary inconvenience on the way to eternal
life-to immortality. Paradoxically, it is his or her exceptionally acute fear
of death that occasions "suicide. '4
This important conference has explored the links between sacred
violence, religion and terrorism.5 On its face, the dreadful connection be-
tween violence and terrorism seems to be a function of religion.6 Religion,
J. INT'L STUD. 131 (1977), reprinted in STUDIES IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM 360 (Augustus R.
Norton & Martin H. Greenberg, eds., 1979); Louis Rend Beres, Israel, the "Peace Process, "
and Nuclear Terrorism: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 767
(1996); Louis Rend Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 1 (1994); Louis Rend Beres, Preventing "The Blood-Dimmed Tide: " How to Avoid
Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States, 24 STRATEGIC REV. 76 (1996); Louis Rend
Beres, Terrorism and International Law, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 291 (1988); Louis Rend Beres,
Terrorism and International Security: The Nuclear Threat, 26 CHnTrY's L.J. 73 (1978);
Louis Rend Beres, The Threat of Palestinian Nuclear Terrorism in the Middle East, 15 INT'L
PROBS 48 (1976); Louis Rend Beres, The United States and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing
World: A Jurisprudential View, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 327 (1994).
3 For the best current discussion of Jihad, see THE LEGACY OF JIHAD: ISLAMIC HOLY WAR
AND THE FATE OF NON-MUSLIMS (Andrew G. Bostom ed., 2005). This magisterial collection,
using extensive primary and secondary source materials, reveals that for centuries jihad
sought to expand Islamic dominance by massacre, pillage, enslavement and deportation. The
argument reproduces extensive quotations from the Qu'ran and the Hadith, along with
Qu'ranic exegeses by the best-known classical and modem commentators. Consequently, the
book thoroughly discredits the position that merely by radical misinterpretation has jihad
warfare been justified.
4 Here, too, we must note that in addition to the promise of immortality, the considerable
incentive of sexual fulfillment. For aspiring suicide-bombers, the promise of beautiful virgins
in the afterlife is entirely literal. It is not mere metaphor. See EFRAIM KARSH, ISLAMIC
IMPERIALISM 19 (2006).
5 From a purely military standpoint, terrorism is generally understood as a form of irregu-
lar warfare, or sometimes low-intensity conflict. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff include ter-
rorism and insurgent warfare in their definition of low-intensity conflict. Heinz Vetschera,
Low-Intensity Conflict: Theory and Concept in 3 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND DEFENSE
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1578, 1578-79 (Trevor N. Dupuy et. al. eds., 1993).
6 For core conventions in force concerning or related to terrorism, see Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 94; Convention on
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and more specifically Islam, is allegedly the root cause of the problem. This
is certainly not incorrect. But I argue that religion here is not the actual un-
derlying cause, but rather the visible part of something much deeper-a
deep and enduring pathology in the human spirit, which is now especially
pervasive in Islam. I refer to the human fear of death, a fear that much has
been written about from the times of Epicurus,7 Lucretius, Epictetus, and
Marcus Aurelius 9 to those of Sigmund Freud, George Santayana,l°Eugene
lonesco, 11 and Ernest Becker.'
2
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T.
2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 218; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S.
177; G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (Dec. 9, 1985) (stating for the first time that
all acts of terrorism are "condemn[ed] as criminal," but failing to fully define terrorism ex-
cept for such acts as hijacking, hostage-taking and attacks on internationally protected per-
sons).
7 In his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus counsels: "Become accustomed to the belief that
death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of
sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality
of life enjoyable, not because it adds to an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the
craving for immortality." Letter from Epicurus to Menoeceus, in THE STOIC AND EPICUREAN
PHILOSOPHERS 30 (Whitney H. Oates et. al. eds., 1940).
8 Aware that Socrates called death fears "bogies," Epictetus inquires: "What is death? A
bogy. Turn it round and see what it is: you see it does not bite. The stuff of the body was
bound to be parted from the airy element, either now or hereafter, as it existed apart from it
before .... " Discourses of Epictetus, in THE STOIC AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHERS 282
(Whitney H. Oates et. al. eds., 1940).
9 We are each "a little soul, carrying a corpse," says Marcus Aurelius. Marcus Aurelius,
Meditations, in THE STOIC AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHERS 514 (Whitney H. Oates et. al. eds.,
1940).
10 Santayana wrote: "In endowing us with memory, nature has revealed to us a truth utter-
ly unimaginable to the unreflective creation ... the truth of mortality .... The more we
reflect, the more we live in memory and idea, the more convinced and penetrated we shall be
by the experience of death; yet, without our knowing it, perhaps, this very conviction and
experience will have raised us, in a way, above mortality." GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE
OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS: REASON IN RELIGION 260 (1905).
11 How does killing in world politics hold out a promise of immortality for the perpetrator?
According to Eugene lonesco, "I must kill my visible enemy, the one who is determined to
take my life, to prevent him from killing me. Killing gives me a feeling of relief, because I
am dimly aware that in killing him, I have killed death .... Killing is a way of relieving
one's feelings, of warding off one's own death." Eugene lonesco, Journal (II), ENCOUNTER,
May 1996, at 25, 27.
12 The idea of death as a zero-sum commodity is captured especially by Ernest Becker's
paraphrase of Elias Canetti: "Each organism raises it head over a field of corpses, smiles into
the sun, and declares life good." ERNEST BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL 2 (1975). Similarly,
according to Otto Rank: "The death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the Sacrifice, of
the other; through the death of the other, one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of
being killed." OTTO RANK, WILL THERAPY AND REALITY 130 (Alfred A. Knopf 1950) (1936).
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There is also a great deal for us to learn about death and eternal life
from the Spanish existentialist Miguel de Unamuno, whose Tragic Sense of
Life has a marvelous chapter on "The Rationalist Dissolution" and another
on "The Hunger of Immortality., 13 How underestimated and ignored is this
primal hunger in our still-limited understanding of terrorism, religion, and
"sacred violence." Oddly enough, we Americans, Canadians, Australians,
and Europeans are fond of projecting our own sense of rationality upon our
adversaries. Acknowledging that Western philosophy has always oscillated
between Plato and Nietzsche, between rationalism and irrationalism, we
have unthinkingly cast our lot with the Greeks and their inheritors. But we
are now up against an entirely different ordering of the universe, and we
would actually do far better as opponents of terrorism to read Dostoyevsky
1 4
or Kafka than to dwell on Grotius, Pufendorf or even Jefferson. 15 1 am fond
of understanding everything (including international law and counter-
terrorism) through drama, art, and literature.
I began this paper with a reference to the French playwright Jean
Giradoux. Let me now proceed to some equally apt words offered by the
Italian dramatist Luigi Pirandello. In his Henry IV, we are confronted with
the "logic" of madness, a logic before which all of the rules of rational be-
havior crumble:
Do you know what it means to find yourselves face to face with a mad-
man-with one who shakes the foundations of all you have built up in
yourselves, your logic, the logic of all your constructions? Madmen, lucky
folk! construct without logic, or rather with a logic that flies like a feath-
er. 16
I'm not at all sure that our present terrorist enemies should be cha-
racterized as "mad," but in a practical sense they are certainly energized by
13 I am fond of advising my students that Unamuno's great work is supremely important to
any serious understanding of the world-including the world of international relations. See
MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO, TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE 38-57, 79-105 (J.E. Crawford Flitch trans.,
Dover Publications unbar. ed., 1954) (1921).
14 Above all, perhaps, Dostoyevsky reminds us: "And what is it in us that is mellowed by
civilization? All it does, I'd say, is to develop in man a capacity to feel a greater variety of
sensations. And nothing, absolutely nothing else. And through this development, man will
yet learn how to enjoy bloodshed. Why, it has already happened .... Civilization has made
man, if not always more bloodthirsty, at least more viciously, more horribly bloodthirsty."
FYODOR DOsTOYEvsKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND 108 (Andrew R. MacAndrew trans.,
New American Library 1961) (1862).
15 On international law, Jefferson is most interesting in his "Opinion on the French Trea-
ties." THOMAs JEFFERSON, OPINION ON THE FRENCH TREATIES (1793), reprinted in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113-14 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1993).
16 Luigi Pirandello, Henry IV, in NAKED MASKS 139, 192 (Eric Bentley ed., Edward Storer
trans., 1952).
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a wholly different hierarchy of preferences and values. From the standpoint
of international law and world order, 17 we must absolutely and immediately
begin to understand the limits of imposing our own notions of compliance
and justice upon an altogether different kind of civilization.
For the Judeo-Christian world, the Treaty of Westphalia, as a matter
of law, put an end to the idea that an enemy in war was a criminal or heretic
upon whom one necessarily waged a war of annihilation.' 8 Following the
Thirty Years War, this idea was refined and codified in such a way as to
render an opponent a "just enemy," or an enemy upon whom one waged
limited war in order to protect our purely secular rights.' 9 Although there
have surely been instances of an absolutely profound disregard for this
transforming idea, it has at least been acknowledged in principle as authori-
tative and normatively binding.20 Significantly, however, the present and
7 The concept of "world order," also referred to as a "world public order," as both an
organizing dimension of scholarship and as a normative goal of international affairs has
many contemporary intellectual origins. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
DIGNITY (Yale Univ. Press ed. 1980); GREENVILLE CLARK & Louis B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE
THROUGH WORLD LAW: TWO ALTERNATIVE PLANS (Harvard Univ. Press 3d ed. 1966) (1958);
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1985).
This author, who was an original participant in the World Law Fund's World Order Models
Project (WOMP), has written several earlier works on this topic. See generally Louis RENE
BERES, AMERICA OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1987);
LOUIS RENE BERES, PEOPLE, STATES, AND WORLD ORDER (1981); PLANNING ALTERNATIVE
WORLD FUTURES: VALUES, METHODS, AND MODELS (Louis Ren6 Beres & Harry R. Targ eds.,
1975); Louis RENi BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD
ORDER (1984); Louis RENE BERES & HARRY R. TARG, REORDERING THE PLANET:
CONSTRUCTING ALTERNATIVE WORLD FUTURES (1974).
18 The Articles of the Treaty of Peace, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; A Treaty Between
the Empire and Sweden, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 119. Together, these two treaties consti-
tute the "Treaty of Westphalia."
19 Consider, here, an expression of limits under the law of war offered by Samuel Pufen-
doff:
As for the force employed in war against the enemy and his property, we should
distinguish between what an enemy can suffer without injustice, and what we can-
not bring to bear against him, without violating humanity. For he who has declared
himself our enemy, inasmuch as this involves the express threat to bring the worst
of evils upon us, by that very act, so far as in him lies, gives us a free hand against
himself, without restriction. Humanity, however, commands that, so far as the
clash of arms permits, we do not inflict more mischief upon the enemy than de-
fense, or the vindication of our right, and security for the future, require.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 2 ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING To NATURAL LAW
169 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthome trans., 1991).
20 See Alberto Moreiras, Against Cultural-Political Closure, 104 S. ATLANTIC Q. 263, 272
(2005), available at http://humanitiesinstitute.buffalo.edu/content/research_publications/
documents/moreirasagclosure.pdf.
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seemingly immutable cry ofjihad l represents a pre-Westphalian notion of
total war that is premised upon the enemy's irremediable lack of sacredness.
To understand the vital linkages between sacred violence, religion,
and terrorism, we first need to understand that our present enemies wholly
reject our post-Westphalian system of international law. This is a stunning
rejection, one with unimaginably grave implications for the so-called "War
on Terror," as well as the counter-proliferation effort.22 It means, inter alia,
21 Historically, Islam has sought to establish a world public order based on divine legisla-
tion and enforce it byjihad. Jihad is the Islamic Just War (bellumjustum) and represents the
very core of Islam's relationship to the nations. For an authoritative study of Islam and inter-
national law, see Shaybanis Siyar, THE ISLAMIc LAW OF NATIONS (Majid Khadduri trans.,
1966).
22 On the "nuclear regime" under international law, including the anti-proliferation meas-
ures, see The Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 70; Memo-
randum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., June 20, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At-
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, U.S.-Gr. Brit.-U.S.S.R., Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T.
1313; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205; Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Apr. 26,
1968, 634 U.N.T.S. 326; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and
in the Subsoil Thereof, U.S.-U.S.S.R.-G.Brit., Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S.
115; Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Sept.
30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communica-
tions Link, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1598; Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435; Interim Agreement Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Meas-
ures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462; Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 29, 1972, 66 DEP'T ST. BULL. 898 (1972);
Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 12, 1974, 71
DEP'T ST. BULL. 217 (1974); Limitation on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276; Joint Statement on the Limitation of Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms (the Vladivostok Agreement), Apr. 29, 1974, 70 DEP'T ST. BULL. 677
(1974); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki
Accords), Aug., 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon Treaty), Report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 34/68 U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/20 Annex 11 (1979); 18
I.L.M. 1434 Dec. 5, 1979; The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24
I.L.M. 1440; The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Mis-
siles (the INF Treaty), Dec. 8, 1987, 88 DEP'T ST. BULL. 24 (Feb. 1988); see also Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Un-
[Vol. 39:709
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
that all prevailing jurisprudential ideas of treaty-based agreements and other
sources of international law23 listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice only bind us.24 We are therefore now contending
with adversaries who do not accept even the most basic jurisprudential as-
sumptions regarding compromise, negotiation, peaceful settlement, or even
humanitarian international law. For the perpetrators of religious extremism
international life is largely a zero-sum game, and the only acceptable out-
come is a transformation of the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam.
25
By itself, violence is not necessarily irrational. In the words of Rene
Girard, whose book Violence and the Sacred should be the underlying text
for any discussion of religion and terrorism, violence sometimes has its rea-
sons.26 Girard-with his usual level of sophistication and extraordinary
anthropological and literary insight-posits that, "[w]hen unappeased, vi-
olence seeks and always finds a surrogate victim. The creature that excited
its fury is abruptly replaced by another, chosen only because it is vulnerable
and close at hand.
' 27
What does this mean to us? Consider the endlessly barbaric Pales-
tinian insurgency against Israel.28 What happens when the Israelis build a
derground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, 74 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 802
(1976); The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the SALT II Treaty, June 18, 1979, S. Exec. Doc., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37
(1979).
23 These other sources include customary international law. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statue
of the International Court of Justice describes international custom as "evidence of a general
practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 29, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993. The essential significance of a norm's customary character is that the
norms bind even those states that are not parties to the pertinent codification. Even where a
customary norm and a norm restated in treaty form are apparently identical, these norms are
treated as jurisprudentially discrete. Discussing the merits phase of Nicaragua v. U.S., the
International Court of Justice stated: "Even if two norms belonging to two sources of interna-
tional law appear identical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these
rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these norms
retain a separate existence." See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 85 (June 27) (Merits).
24 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993.
25 The "World of War" into "The World of Islam."
26 RENt GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED 2 (Patrick Gregory trans., Continuum Books
2005) (1988).
27 Id.
28 See THEODORE HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE 40 (Joseph H. Lookstein ed., Dover Publ'ns
1988) (1946) (discussing the State of Israel and Jewish self-determination). This Dover edi-
tion is an unabridged reproduction of the work published in 1946 by the American Zionist
Emergency Council, which was in turn based on the first English-language edition. Id. The
Herzl text was originally published in Vienna, in 1896, under the title: Der Judenstaat. Id.
Recognizing that "[t]he nations in whose midst Jews live are all either covertly or openly
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wall and make the Palestinians' sacrificial killings (suicide bombings) more
difficult? The Palestinian Arabs slaughter each other-Hamas murders Fa-
tah and Fatah murders Hamas.29 Until they can reconcile temporarily, whe-
reupon they both resume the murder of Jews.
Islamic hatred of Israel is rooted in religion, not land. Even before
the re-creation of the State of Israel in 1948, considerable support for geno-
cide against "The Jews" was displayed enthusiastically and openly while the
Holocaust was underway. 30 On November 21, 1941, the Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem, Haj Amin, met in Berlin with Adolph Hitler.31 The purpose of
this meeting, which followed Haj Amin's organization of SS troops in Bos-
nia, was to ensure cooperation on "The Jewish Question., 32 It was essential,
Haj Amin insisted, that all Jews be sent to countries "where they would find
themselves under active control, for example, in Poland, in order thereby to
protect oneself from their menace and avoid the consequent damage."33
It is also noteworthy that the Palestinians and most other Arabs
have never publicly criticized the Mufti's complicity in the Holocaust geno-
cide. During the 1950s and 1960s, Hitler remained an enormously popular
figure in the Arab world.34 Responses amongst these Islamic populations to
the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (1961) treated the Nazi mass murderer as a
"martyr" and congratulated him for having "conferred a real blessing on
humanity" by enacting the Final Solution.
35
In a prevailing Arab/Islamist view, the Jewish State is always the
individual Jew in macrocosm. 36 This Jewish State must be despised because
of this relationship--because of the allegedly innate "evil" of the individual
Jew.37 This is very different from the view that Jews should be hated be-
anti-Semitic," Herzl put the Jewish Question in the briefest possible form: "Are we to 'get
out' now, and where to? Or, may we yet remain? And, how long?" Id
29 See Palestinian Rivals: Fatah & Hamas, BBC NEWS, June 17, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/middle east/5016012.stm.
30 Cf. JOAN PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-JEWISH
CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE, 382-83 (1984) (stating that Britain's unwillingness to help Jew-
ish immigration "amount[ed] to [a] tacit endorsement [of the Holocaust]").
31 Id. at 436-37.
32 See id. at 437 (translating Mufti's diary stating that he was "resolved to find a solution
for the Jewish problem").
33 Id. at 436-7 (reproducing the Mufti's own account of his meeting with Hitler).
34 See Stephen Wicken, Views of the Holocaust in Arab Media and Public Disclosure, 1
YALE J. INT'L AFF. 103, 107 (2006), available at http://www.yjia.org/userfiles/fileVolume%
201%20Issue%202%20-%2OSpring%202006/9--Stephen%20Wicken.pdf.
35 ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED 247 (1991) (quoting Y.
HARKABI, ARAB ATITUTDES TO ISRAEL 279 (Mishalouvish trans., 1972))
36 Louis Rene Bdres, Israel, The "Peace Process, " and Nuclear Terrorism: A Jurisdic-
tional Perspective, 18 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 767, n. 13 (1996).
37 Id.
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cause of an association with the State of Israel-as a corollary of being
"Zionists." 38 In this view, the Israeli must be loathed not as an "occupier,"
but because he is a Jew.39
In an oft-reprinted article published in al-Ahram, on September 27,
1982, Dr. Lufti Abd al-Azim wrote:
The first thing that we have to make clear is that no distinction must be
made between the Jew and the Israeli, which they themselves deny. The
Jew is a Jew, through the millennia ... in spuming all moral values, de-
vouring the living and drinking his blood for the sake of a few coins. The
Jew, the Merchant of Venice, does not differ from the killer of Deir Yasin
or the killer of the camps. They are equal examples of human degradation.
Let us therefore put aside such distinctions, and talk only about Jews.
40
In a popular Egyptian textbook of "Arab-Islamic History" used in
many teacher-training colleges, we encounter these similar words:
The Jews are always the same, every time and everywhere. They will not
live save in darkness. They contrive their evils clandestinely. They fight
only when they are hidden, because they are cowards. The Prophet enligh-
tened us about the right way to treat them, and succeeded finally in crush-
ing the plots that they had planned. We today must follow this way and pu-
rify Palestine from their filth.
4 1
According to the Charter of Hamas:
Peace initiatives, the so-called peaceful solution, and the international con-
ferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs
of the Islamic Resistance Movement. For renouncing any part of Palestine
means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Re-
sistance Movement is part of its faith, the movement educates its members
to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their ho-
meland as they fight their Jihad .... There is no solution to the Palestinian
problem except by Jihad .... In order to face the usurpation of Palestine
by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of ihad .... We
must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian
problem is a religious one, to be dealt with on this premise .... I swear by
that [sic] who holds in His Hands the Soul of Muhammad! I indeed wish
to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will assault and kill! Assault and Kill!
Assault and Kill!
42
38 id.
39 Id.
40 Id.; BERNARD LEWIS, SEMITES AND ANTI-SEMITES 195 (W.W. Norton Co. 1999) (1987).
41 LEWIS, supra note 40, at 218-19.
42 Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), in
FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM AND ISRAEL 132, 140-43 (Raphael Israeli trans., 1993). Hamas is
2007-2008]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Neither Hamas nor Fatah or even the broader "moderate" Palestine
Authority has any interest in a "two-state solution." In this connection, the
currently operative emphasis of religion is merely the latest manifestation of
the Palestinian Liberation organization's (PLO) "Phased Plan" of June 9,
1974.43 Here, in its twelfth session, the PLO's highest body, the Palestinian
National Council, reiterated the PLO's aim to achieve "their right to return
and their right to self-determination on the soil of their homeland." 44 How-
ever, departing from its then previous strategy, which called for the imme-
diate destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state45 over
all of "Palestine," the Phased Plan was adopted as follows: "First, to estab-
lish a combatant national authority over every part of Palestinian territory
that is liberated" (article 2); Second, to use that territory to continue the
fight against Israel (article 4); finally, to start a pan-Arab war to complete
the liberation of all Palestinian territory; i.e., to eliminate Israel (article
8)."
6
Among the Palestinians, and amidst the Arab/Islamic terrorist
groups in general, "sacred violence" draws very heavily upon repressed or
thwarted sexuality.47 It is hardly a coincidence that "sacred violence" is now
most common in the Arab/Islamic world, where repressed sexual desire
accumulates a relentless energy that, sooner or later, must burst. Most of the
world watches the Jihadist orchestrations of terror, and believes that this
"sacred violence" is essentially political or revolutionary. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
I prepared this paper for a law school conference. Thus, while it is
important that I draw upon creative psychological, literary, and anthropo-
logical insights to better understand "sacred violence," I must also explore
jurisprudential normative controls and determine what the vital connections
are between these various disciplines.
the acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement-Harakat Muqawama Islamiyya-
meaning, literally, "enthusiasm," "zeal," "fanaticism." Id. at 161 n.15. The cited references
concerning the Hamas imperative to "assault and kill" Jews is taken from Bukhari and Mus-
lim, authors of the two most authoritative and widely accepted collections of Hadith (tradi-
tions of the Prophet). Id. at 163, n.32.
43 Political Programme for the Present Stage of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
Drawn up by the Palestinian National Counsel, 3 J. PALESTINE STUD. 224-26 (1974).
44 Id. at 224.
45 Under international law, any Palestinian declaration of statehood would need to satisfy
the settled criteria codified by the Convention on Rights and Duties of States ("The Montevi-
deo Convention") concerning control over a fixed and clearly defined territory, a population,
a government, and the capacity to engage in diplomatic and foreign relations. Convention on
Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
46 EDDIE CHUMNEY, RESTORING THE Two HOUSES OF ISRAEL 337 (1999).
47 See Candice Lys, Demonizing the "Other:" Fundamentalist Pakistani Madrasahs and
the Construction ofReligious Violence, 11 MARBURG J. RELIGION 1, 15 (2006).
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First, international law obviously permits various expressions of or-
ganized violence, including not only "just wars," beginning with the He-
brew Bible and Aristotle, but also certain forms of insurgency.48 We have
known for a long time that "national liberation" and "self-determination"
are perfectly appropriate legal reasons for the assertion of insurgency as
there is ample evidence for this in both codified and customary international
law.49 At the same time, we must recall that every use of force in interna-
tional law must always be judged twice, once with regard to the justness of
the cause, and once with regard to the justness of the means.50 Here we must
think in terms of aggression,5' self-defense,52 and international humanitarian
law, or the law of armed conflict. 53
48 For a discussion of authoritative criteria to distinguish permissible insurgencies from
impermissible ones, see Louis Rend Beres, The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military
Commander, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-11 (1995).
49 Louis Rend Beres, Self-Determination, International Law and Survival on Planet Earth,
II ARiz J. OF INT'L & COMp. L 1, n.1 (1994). See Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.
28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, at 66, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960); Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determin-
ing Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Ar-
ticle 73e of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541, at 29, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15 1960).
50 According to the authoritative rules of international law, the global community must
judge every use of force twice: once with regard to the underlying right to wage war (jus ad
bellum) and once with regard to the means used in actually conducting war (us in bello).
Following the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the United Nations Charter, there can be
absolutely no right to aggressive war. However, the long-standing customary right of post-
attack self-defense remains codified at Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 51.
Similarly, subject to conformance, inter alia, with jus in bello criteria, certain instances of
humanitarian intervention, and collective security operations may also be consistent withjus
ad bellum. The law of war, the rules ofjus in bello, comprise: (1) laws on weapons, (2) laws
on warfare, and (3) humanitarian rules. Codified primarily at the Hague and Geneva Conven-
tions, these rules attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality and military necessity into
all belligerent calculations. Hague Convention IV Respecting Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 630.
51 See Resolution on Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142, U.N. Doc
A/9890 (Dec. 14, 1974); U.N. charter art. 53.
52 The right of self-defense is a genuinely peremptory orjus cogens norm under interna-
tional law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "a perempto-
ry norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character." Id
53 The law of armed conflict is largely concerned with the principle of proportionality,
which has its jurisprudential and philosophic origins in the Biblical Lex Talionis, the law of
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Whatever authoritative sources we examine at Article 38 of the Sta-
tute of the International Court of Justice (which should include Natural
Law,54 as it underlies all positive or codified international law)55 insurgents
exact retaliation. See INGRID DETTER DE Lurpis, THE LAW OF WAR 75 (1987). The "eye for
eye, tooth for tooth" can be found in three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, or Biblical
Pentateuch. MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW AND
LITERATURE 60 (1990). These Torah rules are likely related to the Code of Hammurabi
(1728-1686)--the first written evidence of penalizing wrongdoing with exact retaliation. Id.
at 62. In matters concerning personal injury, the code prescribes an eye for an eye (#196),
breaking bone for bone (#197), and extracting tooth for tooth (#199). Id. Among the ancient
Hebrews, we must speak not of the Lex Talionis, but of several. Id. at 68. The Lex Talionis
appears in only three passages of the Torah. Id. at 69. In their sequence of probable antiquity,
they are as follows: Exodus 21: 22-25; Deuteronomy 19: 19-21; and Leviticus 24: 17-2 1.
HENBERG, at 69. All have similarities to various other Near Eastern legal codes. Id. These
three passages address specific concerns: hurting a pregnant woman, perjury, and guarding
Yahweh's altar against defilement. Id. In contemporary international law, the principle of
proportionality can be found in the traditional view that a state offended by another state's
use of force, if the offending state refuses to make amends, "is then entitled to take 'propor-
tionate reprisals."' DE LuPis, at 75 (1987) (citation omitted). Evidence for the rule of propor-
tionality can also be found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171,174, 6 I.L.M. 368, 369-70. Similarly, the American Convention on Human
Rights allows such derogations "in time of war, public danger or other emergency which
threaten the independence or security of a party" on "condition of proportionality." American
Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Joge, Costa Rica" art. 27 (1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.
T.S. No. 36, art. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 151. In essence, the military principle of proportionali-
ty requires that the amount of destruction permitted must be proportionate to the importance
of the objective. In contrast, the political principle of proportionality states "a war cannot be
just unless the evil that can reasonably be expected to ensure from the war is less than the
evil that can reasonably be expected to ensue if the war is not fought." DOUGLAS P. LACKEY,
THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 40 (1989).
54 The idea of natural law is based upon acceptance of certain principles of right and jus-
tice that prevail because of their own intrinsic merit. Eternal and immutable, they are external
to all acts of human will and interpenetrate all human reason. See CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA,
DE LEGIBUS 211(T.E. Page et al. eds., Clinton Walker Keyes trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1966) (1928). This notion and its attendant tradition of human civility runs almost conti-
nuously from Mosaic Law and the ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day. The Stoics
regarded nature itself as the supreme legislator in a moral order where man, through his
divinely-granted capacity to reason, can commune directly with the gods. See id. at 323. As
set forth in De Republica and De Legibus, Cicero's classical concept of natural law unders-
cores a principle that is now very much a part of the United States constitutional foundation:
that is, the imperative quality of the civil law is always contingent upon being in perfect
harmony with reason. See id. at 211, 317, 321-323, 333. According to Cicero, justice is
not-as the Epicureans claimed-a mere matter of utility. See id. at 333, 345. Rather, it is a
distinct institution of nature that always transcends expediency and that must be embodied by
positive law before such normative obligations can ever claim any proper human loyalties.
See id. 317-53.
55 Emmerich de Vattel's The Law of Nations gave important emphasis to the natural law
origins of all international law. See Albert De Lapradelle, Introduction to EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 114-16 (James Brown Scott, ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
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are expected to comply with the basic principles of the Martens Clause56
and the St. Petersburg Declaration.5 7 This means that no matter how just the
cause of an insurgent group engaged in "sacred violence" may be, any resort
to unjust means is automatically an incontestable indication of terrorism. 58
Philosophically, the just cause problem here is international law's mistaken
emphasis on a collective self. If our jurisprudence had sought to "deter-
mine" the self of the individual, not the aspiring nation-state (the "primal
horde" of Freud, the "herd" of Nietzsche, 59 the "crowd" of Kierkegaard 60)
we would instead be on the gainful path to some serious resolution of terror-
ism and "sacred violence." In this connection, the work of the Swiss psy-
Oceana Publications 1964) (1758). Arguing from the assumption that nations are no less
subject to the laws of nature than are individuals, he concluded that what one man owes to
other men, one nation, in turn, owes to all other nations, "[s]ince Nations are bound mutually
to promote the society of the human race, they owe one another all the duties which the
safety and welfare of that society require." Id. at 113. With this in mind, Vattel proceeded to
advance a permanent standard by which we can distinguish between lawful and unlawful
practices in global affairs: "[slince, therefore, the necessary Law of Nations consists in ap-
plying the natural law to States, and since the natural law is not subject to change, being
founded on the nature of things and particularly upon the nature of man, it follows that the
necessary Law of Nations is not subject to change. Since this law is not subject to change,
and the obligations which it imposes are necessary and indispensable, nations can not alter it
by agreement, nor individually or mutually release themselves from it." Id. at 4.
56 The Martens Clause is included in the Preamble of the 1899 Hague Conventions. Inter-
national Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War by Land Preamble, July
29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 429, 430. The clause is paraphrased and is given higher status in
the 1977 Protocol I by being included in the main text of Article 1. Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 art.1, June 8, 1977, 125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7, 16 I.L.M.
1391, 1396-97. In situations not covered by this Protocol or by other international agree-
ments, the Clause provides that "civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience." Id.
57 See Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under the
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297.
58 Under international law, terrorists are always hostes humani generis, "common enemies
of mankind." Research in International Law: Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 1935) 435, 566 (quoting King v. Marsh (1615), 3 Bulstr.
27, 81 Eng. Rep 23 (1615)("a pirate est Hostes humani generis.")).
59 "[T]he State," says Nietzsche, "lies in all the tongues of good and evil; and whatever it
says it lies-and whatever it has stolen. Everything about it is false .... All-too-many are
born: for the superfluous, the State was invented." Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 160, 161 (Walter A. Kaufman trans., The Viking Press
1967) (1954).
60 Recognizing the "crowd" as "untruth," the nineteenth-century Danish philosopher
warns, "[A] crowd in its very concept is the untruth, by reason of the fact that it renders the
individual completely impenitent and irresponsible, or at least weakens his sense of respon-
sibility by reducing it to a fraction.... For 'crowd' is an abstraction and has not hands: but
each individual has ordinarily two hands . . ." Soren Kierkegaard, That Individual, in
ExISTENTIALISM: FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 92, 92-94 (Walter A. Kaufmann ed., 1956).
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chologist Carl G. Jung, 61 as well as the American transcendentalists, espe-
cially Emerson and Thoreau, could actually be quite helpful.
The title of this paper includes the word "perfidy., 62 Perfidy is a
codified violation of the law of war, especially as a "grave breach," and has
the effect of placing jurisprudential responsibility for pertinent non-
combatant harms entirely upon the perfidious party.63 In other words, the
legal effect of perfidy is exculpatory for the party that is actually inflicting
the harm, so long as that party itself has just cause for its resort to force and
seeks to minimize collateral harms within the bounds of "military necessi-
ty."
64
61 Carl G. Jung observes: "[I]f people crowd together and form a mob, then the dynamics
of the collective man are set free-beasts or demons which lie dormant in every person till he
is part of a mob. Man in the crowd is unconsciously lowered to an inferior moral and intel-
lectual level, to that level which is always there, below the threshold of consciousness, ready
to break forth as soon as it is stimulated through the formation of a crowd." Carl G. Jung,
Psychology and Religion, in 2 THE WORLD OF PSYCHOLOGY: IDENTITY AND MOTIVATION
476-77 (G.B. Levitas ed., 1963).
62 Deception can certainly be legal under the law of armed conflict, but the Hague Regula-
tions clearly disallow any placement of military assets or personnel in populated civilian
areas. Prohibition of perfidy is codified at Protocol I of 1977, additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, and at Geneva IV, Art. 28. Protocol I, supra note 56; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 28, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 3542, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308. It is widely recognized that these rules are also
binding on the basis of customary international law. Perfidy represents an especially serious
violation of the law of war, one that is identified as a "Grave Breach" at Article 147 of Ge-
neva Convention IV. Geneva Convention IV, at art. 147. Significantly, in our current con-
text, the legal effect of perfidious behavior is always to immunize the preempting state from
any unavoidable harms done to the perfidious party's noncombatant populations.
63 The term "Grave Breaches" applies to certain infractions of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Protocol I of 1977. Protocol I, supra note 56. The actions defined as "Grave
Breaches" in the four Conventions must be performed willfully or intentionally, and against
the different groups of "protected person" identified by each Convention. Id. The High Con-
tracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions are under obligation "to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed," a grave breach of the Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949 75 U.N.T.S. 287,6 U.S.T. 3516.
Grave Breaches "shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against
persons or property protected by the present Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a pro-
tected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or
willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." Id; The
Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Commission Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, Annex I, art. 47, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/25274 (Jan. 26, 1993).
64 The principle of "military necessity" has been defined authoritatively as follows: "Only
that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required
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Iran is a current example of this. The President of Iran has repeated-
ly advocated genocide against the State of Israel (in violation of the codified
provisions of the Genocide Convention). 65 At the same time, Iran is prepar-
for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life
and physical resources may be applied." Introduction, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
1, 10 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2000) (1982) (citing
U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY (JOINTLY WITH HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS AND DEP'T OF
TRANSP., U.S. COAST GUARD), NAVAL WARFARE PUBLICATION 1-14M: THE COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, at 5-1 (1995)). The term "military necessi-
ty" is found, inter alia, in the 1946 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nu-
remberg: Extracts on Crimes Against International Law, referring to Article 6(b) of the Lon-
don Charter, August 8, 1945: "War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to murder, ill-treatment, or deportation
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity." Judgment of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: Extracts on Crimes Against International Law
(1946), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 175, 177 (Adam Roberts & Richard
Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) (1982) (emphasis added).
65 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Although the criminalizing aspect of international
law that proscribes genocide-like conduct may derive from a source other than the Genocide
Convention (i.e., it may emerge from customary international law and be included in differ-
ent international conventions), such conduct is clearly a crime under international law. Even
where the conduct in question does not affect the interests of more than one state, it becomes
an international crime whenever it constitutes an offense against the world community delic-
to jus gentium. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/819 (Dec. 12 1948); American Convention on
Human Rights: "Pact of San Joge, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, art. 5
1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 146; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174-75; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M 360; International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 211, 5 I.L.M. 352; Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 47/135,
Annex, U.N. Doc A/Res/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992); Convention on the Political Rights
of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (this Convention
should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its
Optional Protocol of 1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights-known collectively as the International Bill of Rights--serve as the touchstone for
the normative protection of human rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plkn. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/819 (Dec. 12 1948); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174-75;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M 360.
Jurisprudentially, we are also speaking here of "crimes against humanity." See Agree-
ment for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
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ing to develop nuclear weapons. Assuming that Israel, under customary
international law, would have the right of anticipatory self-defense 66 against
Iran, then what of the many Iranian civilians who might die in the Israeli
preemptive strike against pertinent nuclear infrastructures? As Iran has pur-
posefully moved noncombatants into areas with sensitive nuclear targets,
and has correspondingly moved sensitive nuclear structures and assets into
noncombatant residential areas, 67 the full legal responsibility for any harms
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (providing a definition of "crimes against
humanity"). The principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal were affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly as
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec.
11, 1946). This Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunal was followed by General Assembly Resolution 177 (11), adopted
November 21, 1947, directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) Formulate the
principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in
the judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and
security of mankind .... G.A. Res. 177(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov.
21, 1947). The principles formulated are known as the Principles of International Law Rec-
ognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N.
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
66 For earlier writings by this author on anticipatory self-defense under international law,
see Louis Rend Beres, Israel's Strategic Future, Project Daniel, Ariel Ctr for Poli'y Res.
Policy Paper No. 155 (2004); Louis Rend Beres, Israel's Survival Imperatives: The Oslo
Agreements in International Law and National Strategy, Ariel Ctr for Poli'y Res. Policy
Paper No. 25 (1998); Louis Rend Beres, Security Threats and Effective Remedies: Israel's
Strategic, Tactical, and Legal Options, Ariel Ctr for Pol'y Res. Policy Paper No. 102 (2000);
Louis Rend Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13
Hous. J. INT'L L. 259 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine,'
and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1992); Louis Rend Beres, Assas-
sinating Saddam Hussein: The View from International Law, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
847, 859-60 (2003); Louis Rend Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 89 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Force, and International Law: Assessing
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 JERUSALEM J. OF INT'L REL. 1 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, The
Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can it Include Assassination, 31 DENV.
J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 157, 164 (2002); Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory
Self-Defense: Is it Permissible?, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 13 (1992); Louis Rend Beres,
Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under Internation-
al Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111(1993); Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as
Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321 (1991); Louis Rend
Beres, Rejoinder, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 445, 447 (1995); Louis Rend Beres, Striking
'First:' Israel's Post Gulf War Options Under International Law, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1991).
67 GREENPEACE, AN OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN IRAN, ISRAEL AND TURKEY: A
GREENPEACE BRIEFING 8-12 (2007), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/
intemational/press/reports/nuclear-facilities-iran-israel-turkey.pdf.
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accruing from an essential act of Israeli anticipatory self-defense would fall
entirely upon Iran.
68
In the case of Iran and Israel, "sacred violence" is what animates
Iranian nuclearization. In this case, Iranian "perfidy," (codified primarily by
Geneva Law) could have the effect of deterring an Israeli preemption. 69 This
would follow from Israeli concerns about injuring and killing Iranian non-
combatants. Nonetheless, at least, from the standpoint of law, Israel would
not need to be so deterred.70
Another term that appears in the title of my remarks is "irrationali-
ty." I have noted before, per Rene Girard, that violence need not necessarily
be irrational.7' Usually, from the standpoint of strategic studies, we define a
rational state actor as one who values its continued existence more highly
than any other preference or combination of preferences.
What if, in the near future, a state such as Iran was willing to "die"
in order to achieve a particular religious outcome-in essence, to become a
suicide-bomber in macrocosm? This is not a silly question. On the contrary,
Iran's current president is a believer in the return of the missing Twelfth
Imam (the Mahdi), and in the idea that such coming must take place in the
context of an apocalyptic war against the "unbelievers. 72
68 Here we must recall that criminal responsibility of leaders under international law is not
limited to direct personal action nor is it limited by official position. On the principle of
command responsibility, or respondeat superior, see, e.g., Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1
(1945); Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb (Case No. 72) 12 L. Rep. Trials War Criminals 1 (1948);
William V. O'Brian, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J.
605 (1972); William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REv. 1
(1973). The direct individual responsibility of leaders is also unambiguous in view of the
London Agreement, which denies defendants the protection of the act of state defense. See
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
69 See generally Louis Ren6 Beres, After the Falling Rockets from Lebanon: Interrelated
Commentaries on Israel's Performance and Survival, 10 NATIV ONLINE (2006), available at
http://www.acpr.org.il/english-nativ/10-issue/beres-I 0.htm.
70 Additional legal arguments can be mustered here in support of Israel. Recalling that the
right to self-defense is absolutely peremptory, and is also deducible from antecedent natural
law, from which all international law ultimately derives, each state must cooperate in the
protection of Israel from the effects of any perfidy and planned aggression. See supra note 50
and accompanying text. Here, the words of William Blackstone are especially elucidating:
"Each state is expected to "aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the common law; by
inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses against that universal law .... William
Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 73 (1769). Of course, Blackstone's
jurisprudential correctness is apt to be less compelling than presumed geopolitical and "sa-
cred" enemy expectations.
71 GIRARD, supra note 26, at 2 ("Violence is frequently called irrational. It has its reasons,
however, and can marshal some rather convincing ones when the need arises.").
72 Con Coughlin, Will the 12th Imam Cause War with Iran?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 28,
2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinionlmain.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/09/ 2 8/do2 804 .
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I have done some looking into the idea of apocalypse (it has inter-
ested me since I first wrote a book with that word in the title in 1980), 7" and
it seems certain that both the Jews and the Christians drew some of their
eschatology, "last things," from ancient Persia (now modem-day Iran).74
Indeed, there is substantial evidence (I think especially of the Dead Sea
Scrolls and the document called The War of the Sons of Light and the Sons
of Darkness) that the Jews-who passed along their apocalypse in some
form to the Christians-were themselves deeply influenced by the earlier
Persian Zoroastrians.75 The latter were distinctly Manichean, and subscribed
to a stark dualism between Good and Evil.76
Not much has changed in the broadly conceptual world of "sacred
violence." It is, to various Arab/Islamic terror groups and states, still a con-
stant war between "us" and "them., 77 In this war, as I had mentioned earlier,
there can be absolutely no possibility of compromise. 78 As for international
xml.
73 See generally LouIs RENE BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD
POLITICS (1980).
74 See, e.g., James Barr, The Question of Religious Influence: The Case of Zoroastrianism,
Judaism, and Christianity, 53 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 201, 201 (1985) ("The development
within Jewish religion of such matters as angels, dualism, eschatology, and the resurrection
of the body is commonly attributed to the impact of Iranian religion.").
75 See, e.g., id. at 205 (stating that several scholars have "greatly confirmed the idea" that
the Dead Sea Scrolls are proof of Iranian influence on Judaism); A.V. Williams Jackson,
Zoroastrianism and the Resemblance Between It and Christianity, 27 Biblical World 335,
335 (1906) ("[There are] numerous resemblance between Zoroastrianism and Christianity,
and points of contact with Judaism in earlier times.").
76 See Manfred Hunter, Manichaeism in the Early Sasanian Empire, 40 NUMEN 2, 5-6
(1993) (stating that Zoroastrians believed in a "dualism which showed good and evil in the
spiritual and in the material").
77 Under international law, the question of whether or not a condition of war actually
exists between states is somewhat unclear. Traditionally, a "formal" war was said to exist
only when a state made a formal declaration of war. The Hague Convention III codified this
position in 1907. Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities art. 1, Oct. 18,
1907, 26 Stat. 2259, 205 Consol. T.S. 263. This Convention provided that hostilities must not
commence without "previous and explicit warning" in the form of a declaration of war or an
ultimatum. Id. Presently, a declaration of war may be tantamount to a declaration of crimi-
nality because international law prohibits aggression. See General Treaty for the Renuncia-
tion of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94
L.N.T.S. 57; 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals 171 (1947) (stating the "Nuremberg Judg-
ment"), U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. A state may compromise its own legal position by an-
nouncing formal declarations of war. See Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of
Hostilities art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 26 Stat. 2259, 205 Consol. T.S. 263. It follows that a state of
belligerency may exist without formal declarations, but only if there exists an armed conflict
between two or more states or at least one of these states considers itself "at war."
78 Cf KARSH, supra note 4, at 1; Kenneth LEvIN, THE OSLO SYNDROME; DELUSIONS OF A
PEOPLE UNDER SIEGE X (2005); THE LEGACY OF JIHAD: ISLAMIC HOLY WAR AND THE FATE OF
NON-MUSLIMS 24 (Andrew G. Bostom ed., 2005).
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law, it is little more than tactically expedient; to be used and manipulated
only according to the presumed will of Allah.79
Conceptually, I have sought to link "sacred violence" with interna-
tional law, perfidy, preemption, and irrationality. The links here are tenta-
tive, but worthy of a continuing and much deeper examination. At the most
obvious level, virtually all of the violence that we now face as a civilization
is "sacred violence," and essentially all of this threatened violence, (which
could include mass-destruction terrorism) has its roots in acute death fear
80
and systematically repressed sexuality.
It is also rooted in elements of an Arab/Islamic civilization that po-
sitively loathes the individual (making it diametrically opposite to the indi-
vidualism that we have learned to value in our own societies) 81 and that
makes membership in the group (the sacred group) the very highest kind of
expectation.
Finally, "sacred violence" draws upon the universal human need for
ecstasy, a need that cannot be readily fulfilled in the Arab/Islamic world,
and which therefore needs to be sublimated into very destructive forms of
individual and collective behaviors. 82 Citing to Euripides' Medea, Rend
79 It is therefore an Islamic variant of secular realpolitik or "Power Politics." The classic
expression of realpolitik is Thrasymachus' comment: "justice is nothing else than the interest
of the stronger." PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 29 (Benjamin Jowett trans., The World Publishing
Co. 1946).
80 The fact of having been born augurs badly for immortality, and the human inclination to
rebel against an apparently unbearable fate produces the very terrors from which humans
always seek to escape. In their desperation to live perpetually, human societies and civiliza-
tions embrace a broad panoply of faiths that promise life everlasting in exchange for "undy-
ing" loyalty. In the end, such loyalty is transferred from the Faith to the State, which then
battles with other States in what is generally taken to be a "struggle for power," but which is
often, in reality, a perceived Final Conflict between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Dark-
ness. See NEIL ASHER SILBERMAN, THE HIDDEN SCROLLS 254-7 (1994). The advantage to
being on the side of the Sons of Light in any such contest is nothing less than the promise of
eternal life. This "advantage" is now especially apparent in the expanding power of Islamic
radicalism throughout the world.
81 In contrast, note here that Jewish Law (Halakah) rests upon the twin principles of the
sovereignty of God and the absolute sacredness of the Individual. On the centrality of the
dignity of the Individual to the Talmudic conception of law. See S. BELKIN, IN His IMAGE:
THE JEWISH PHILOSOPHY OF MAN AS EXPRESSED IN RABBINIC TRADITION (1960). From the
sacredness of the Individual, which derives from each person's resemblance to Divinity,
flows the human freedom to choose. Failure to exercise this freedom represents a betrayal of
legal responsibility. On human freedom to choose good over evil. J.B. SOLOVEITCHIK,
THOUGHTS AND VISIONS: THE MAN OF LAW 725 (1944).
82 I think here of Eugene lonesco, who comments instructively: "People kill and are killed
in order to prove to themselves that life exists." EUGtNE IONESCO, THE HERMIT 102 (Richard
Seaver trans., Viking Press 1974) (1973). This is not an obvious reference to the human need
for ecstasy, but upon more deliberate consideration, it becomes apparent that all ecstatic
feeling must exist along a continuum, ranging from mere affirmation of existence (lonesco)
to utterly explosive reminders (the suicide bomber).
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Girard reminds us of another fundamental truth about "sacred violence:" "If
left unappeased, violence will accumulate until it overflows its confines and
floods the surrounding area. The role of sacrifice is to stem the rising tide of
indiscriminate substitutions and redirect violence into 'proper channels."'"3
We are those "proper channels." It follows that we must now work
with vastly more imaginative approaches to international law, in order to
curtail the pace of religious sacrifice in certain portions of the Arab/Islamic
world.84 This means exploring paths for remediation that have never been
explored before; that have, indeed, never even been imagined or understood.
In principle, we could try to think of ways to move from a no longer useful
Westphalianism, to a new global cosmopolis, this would never work in
time. In principle, we could try to think of ways to limit Arab/Islamic death
fears and institutionally repressed sexuality, but, in fact, that would take
centuries to work, if ever at all.
Much as I would prefer to end on a hopeful note, "sacred violence"
will likely propel the planet toward mega-terrorism and apocalyptic war in
the next several years unless we can fashion certain appropriate near-term
solutions. Recalling the legal implications of perfidy for anticipatory self-
defense, and understanding the potentially dreadful fusion of enemy irratio-
nality with weapons of mass destruction, our only immediate remedy ap-
pears to lie in preemption.85 It is an imperfect remedy, to be sure, one that
83 GIRARD, supra note 26, at 10.
84 Here it must be recalled that terrorism in most instances in the Arab/Islamic world is
now an expression of precisely such religious sacrifice, and that counter-terrorism under
international law must rest upon longstanding ideas of "universal jurisdiction." VATTEL,
supra note 55, at 93. Jurisprudentially, these terrorist sacrificers are hostes humani generis,
international outlaws within the scope of universal jurisdiction. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
755 (8th ed. 2004) (defining hostes humani generis as "[e]nemies of the human race; specif.,
pirates"). "[W]hile the jurisdiction of each State is in general limited to punishing crimes
committed in its territory, an exception must be made against those criminals who, by the
character and frequency of their crimes, are a menace to public security everywhere, and
proclaim themselves enemies of the whole human race. Men who are by profession poisoners
[sic], assassins, or incendiaries may be exterminated wherever they are caught; for they di-
rect their disastrous attacks against all Nations, by destroying the foundations of their com-
mon safety." VATTEL, supra note 55, at 93.
83 The customary right of anticipatory self-defense, which is the legal expression of
preemption, has its modern origins in the Caroline Incident. Beth M. Polebaum, National
Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 187, 190 (1984). This was part of the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada
against British rule. Id. at 190-191 (noting that the Caroline Incident transformed the right of
self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a customary legal doctrine). Follow-
ing the Caroline, even the threat of an armed attack has generally been accepted as justifica-
tion for a militarily defensive action. Id. at 191. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between
the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then-U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that does not actually require a prior armed
attack. Id. (citing R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 90
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does not get to the heart of the problem, and one that is necessarily partial
and transient. Nonetheless, all options presently before us are manifestly
unattractive, 86 and our only rational choice is to select the least unattractive
87
option.
International law is not a suicide pact. Facing various intolerable
expressions of "sacred violence," the civilized community of states must
quickly understand the availability of authoritative norms supporting antic-
ipatory self-defense. Recalling Cicero's earlier warnings on attempting to
deal with force without force, we may also consider his speech in defense of
Milo:
[I]f our life be in danger from plots, or from open violence, or from the
weapons of robbers or enemies, every means of securing our safety is ho-
norable. For laws are silent when arms are raised, and do not expect them-
selves to be waited for, when he who waits will have to suffer an unde-
served penalty before he can exact a merited punishment. 88
(1938)). Here, a defensive military response to a threat was judged permissible as long as the
danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation." Polebaum, at 191.
86 "For what can be done against force without force?" inquires Cicero. MARCUS TULLSI
CICERO, CICERO'S LETTERS TO HIs FRIENDS 78 (D.R. Shackleton Baley trans., Scholars Press
1988).
87 Here it must also be understood that all conclusions are necessarily tentative, and that
there must be a continuing intellectual effort to identify better policy options. See Jack Mezi-
row, Transformative Learning as Discourse, 1 J. TRANSFORMATIVE EDUC. 58, 61 (2003). It is
essential, in this connection, that dialectical reasoning be employed. See id. "The term 'di-
alectic' originates from the Greek expression for the art of conversation." Dialectic in 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 385 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). Today, a common meaning is
that dialectic represents a method of truth-seeking via correct reasoning. See id. The follow-
ing operations may be identified as crucial but non-exclusive components of a strategic di-
alectic: (1) a method of refutation by examining logical consequences, (2) a method of divi-
sion or repeated logical analysis of genera into species, (3) logical reasoning using premises
that are probable or generally accepted, (4) formal logic, and (5) logical development of
thought through thesis and antithesis to a synthesis of opposites. Id. Dialectic likely began in
the Fifth Century, as Zeno, author of Paradoxes, was acknowledged by Aristotle as its inven-
tor. DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS 59, 249 (A. Robert Caponigri ed.,
trans., 1969). In the middle dialogues of Plato, dialectic emerges as the highest form of "in-
telligence." Plato, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, INCLUDING THE
LETTERS 575, 746, 765 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Cooper et al. trans., Pan-
theon Books 1961) (1938). In one dialogue, Plato describes the dialectician as one who
knows how to ask and answer questions. See Plato, Gorgias, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES
OF PLATO, INCLUDING THE LETTERS 229, 232,234.
88 The Speech of MT. Cicero in Defense of Titus Annius Milo, in CICERO: SELECT
ORATIONS, 174, 178 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1889). Both Grotius and Vattel parallel the Jewish
interpreters on preemption and what we now call "anticipatory self-defense." HUGO
GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1646), reprinted in 3 CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169-75 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) (1913); VATTEL, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, reprinted
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"All those who are merciful to the cruel," warns the Talmud, "will come to
be cruel to the merciful."89
"C'est beau, n'est-ce pas, la fin du monde?" 90
in 3 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (James Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick
trans., Oceana Publ'ns Inc. 1964) (1916). The Torah contains a provision exonerating from
guilt a potential victim of robbery with possible violence, if, in self-defense, he struck down
and if necessary even killed the attacker before he committed any crime. See RAMBAN:
COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH 377-378 (Rabbi Dr. Charles B. Chavel, trans.) (1973) (com-
menting on verses in Exodus). In the words of the rabbis: "If [a man] come[s] to slay [you],
forestall by slaying him." II Sanhedrin, in 6 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 465, 489 (H. Freed-
man, trans.) (1935).
89 See Eliav Shochetman, He Who is Compassionate to the Cruel Will Ultimately Become
Cruel to the Compassionate, 6 NATIV ONLINE, http://www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/06-
issue/shochetman-6.htm (describing the origins and uses of this popular folk saying); see
also MOSES MAIMONIDES, II THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED 554 (Shlomo Pines trans., 1963);
see also ECCLESIASTES, in 8 MIDRASH RABBAH at 199 (Rabbi Dr. H. Freedman, et al. eds.
Rabbi Dr. L. Rabinowitz trans.) (1983). This Talmudic warning takes on an additionally
important jurisprudential meaning because of the clear and continuing connection between
Jewish law and natural law: "Whatever a competent scholar will yet derive from the Law,
that was already given to Moses on Mount Sinai." See 19 CHICAGO STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF JUDAISM, THE TALMUD OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL 143 (Jacob Neusner, et al eds., Jacob
Neusner, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1987) (1982). Here, derivatively, we may also recall
Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Augustine: "St. Augustine says: 'There is no law unless it
be just.' So the validity of law depends upon its justice. But in human affairs, a thing is said
to be just when it accords aright with the rule of reason; and as we have already seen, the first
rule of reason is the Natural Law. Thus, all humanly enacted laws are in accord with reason
to the extent that they derive from the Natural Law. And if a human law is at variance in any
particular with the Natural Law, it is no longer legal, but rather a corruption of law." A.P.
D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 42-43 (H.J. Paton
ed., 1964) (1951) (citing ST. THoMAs AQUINAS, II SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1014 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911)).
90 GmAUDOUX, supra note 1, at 96.
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